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Towards A Computational Model of
the Self-Attribution of Agency
Koen V. Hindriks1 and Pascal Wiggers1 and Catholijn M. Jonker1 and Willem F.G. Haselager2
Abstract. In this paper, a first step towards a computational model
of the self-attribution of agency is presented, based on Wegner’s the-
ory of apparent mental causation. A model to compute a feeling of
doing based on first-order Bayesian network theory is introduced that
incorporates the main contributing factors to the formation of such a
feeling. The main contribution of this paper is the presentation of a
formal and precise model that can be used to further test Wegner’s
theory against quantitative experimental data.
1 INTRODUCTION
The difference between falling and jumping from a cliff is a signifi-
cant one. Traditionally, this difference is characterized in terms of the
contrast between something happening to us and doing something.
This contrast, in turn, is cashed out by indicating that the person in-
volved had mental states (desires, motives, reasons, intentions, etc.)
that produced the action of jumping, and that such factors were ab-
sent or ineffective in the case of falling. Within philosophy, major
debates have taken place about a proper identification of the relevant
mental states and an accurate portrayal of the relation between these
mental states and the ensuing behavior (e.g. [2, 22, 6, 4, 5, 16, 11]
to name but a few). In this paper, however, we will focus on a psy-
chological question: how does one decide that oneself is the orig-
inator of one’s behavior? Where does the feeling of agency come
from? Regarding this question we start with the assumption that an
agent generates explanatory hypotheses about events in the environ-
ment, a.o. regarding physical events, the behavior of others and of
him/herself. In line with this assumption, in [19] Wegner has singled
out three factors involved in the self-attribution of agency; the prin-
ciples of priority, consistency and exclusivity. Although his account
is detailed, both historically and psychologically, Wegner does not
provide a formal model of his theory, nor a computational mecha-
nism. In this paper, we will provide a review of the basic aspects of
Wegner’s theory, and sketch the outlines of a computational model
implementing it, with a particular focus on the priority principle.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an outline
of Wegner’s theory and introduces the main contributing factors in
the formation of an experience of will. In section 3, it is argued that
first-order Bayesian network theory is the appropriate modeling tool
for modeling the theory of apparent mental causation and a model of
this theory is presented. In section 4, the model is instantiated with
the parameters of the I Spy experiment as performed by Wegner and
the results are evaluated. Finally, section 5 concludes and gives some
directions for future research.
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2 APPARENT MENTAL CAUSATION
Part of a theory of mind is the link between an agent’s state and its ac-
tions. That is, agents describe, explain and predict actions in terms of
underlying mental states that cause the behavior. In particular, human
agents perceive their intentions as causes of their behavior. Moreover,
intentions to do something that occur prior to the corresponding act
are interpreted as reasons for doing the action. This understanding
is not fully present yet in very young children. But by the age of 4
or 5, children also are able to distinguish intentions from desires or
preferences and from the outcomes of intentional actions [3, 23].
But even to adults it is not always clear-cut whether or not an ac-
tion was caused by ones own prior intentions. For example, when
one finds someone else on the line after making a phone call to a
friend using voice dialing, various explanations may come to mind.
The name may have been pronounced incorrectly making it hard to
recognize it for the phone, the phone’s speech recognition unit may
have mixed up the name somehow, or, alternatively, one may have
more or less unconsciously mentioned the name of someone else
only recognizing this fact when the person is on the line. The percep-
tion of agency thus may vary depending on the perception of one’s
own mind and the surrounding environment.
In the self-attribution of agency, intentions play a crucial role, but
the conscious experience of a feeling that an action was performed
by the agent itself still may vary quite extensively. We want to gain
a better understanding of the perception of agency, in particular of
the attribution of agency to oneself. We believe that the attribution of
agency plays an important role in the interaction and the progression
of interaction between agents, whether they are human or computer-
based agents. As the example of the previous paragraph illustrates, in
order to understand human interaction with a computer-based agent
it is also important to understand the factors that play a role in human
self-attribution of agency. Such factors will enhance our understand-
ing of the level of control that people feel when they find themselves
in particular environments. One of our objectives is to build a com-
putational model to address this question which may also be useful
in the assessment by a computer-based agent of the level of control
of one of its human counterparts in an interaction.
As our starting point for building such a model, we use Wegner’s
theory of apparent mental causation [20]. Wegner argues that there is
more to intentional action than forming an intention to act and per-
forming the act itself. A causal relation between intention and action
may not always be present in a specific case, despite the fact that it
is perceived as such. This may result in an illusion of control. Vice
versa, in other cases, humans that perform an act do not perceive
themselves as the author of those acts, resulting in more or less au-
tomatic behavior (automatisms). As Wegner shows, the causal link
between intention and action cannot be taken for granted.
Wegner interprets the self-attribution of agency as an experience
that is generated by an interpretive process that is fundamentally sep-
arate from the mechanistic process of real mental causation [19]. He
calls this experience the feeling of doing or the experience of will.3
The fact that Wegner’s theory explains the feeling of doing as the
result of an interpretive process is especially interesting for our pur-
poses. It means that this theory introduces the main factors that play
a role in interpreting action as caused by the agent itself retrospec-
tively. It thus provides a good starting point for constructing a com-
putational model that is able to correctly attribute agency to a human
agent when it is provided with the right inputs.
Wegner identifies three main factors that contribute to the experi-
ence of conscious will, or a feeling of doing: (i) An intention to act
should have been formed just before the action was performed. That
is, the intention must appear within an appropriately small window
of time before the action is actually performed. Wegner calls this the
priority principle. (ii) The intention to act should be consistent with
the action performed. This is called the consistency principle. (iii)
The intention should exclusively explain the action. There should not
be any other prevailing explanations available that would explain the
action and discount any intention, if present, as a cause of the action.
This is called the exclusivity principle.
A crucial factor in assessing the contribution of the priority prin-
ciple to the feeling of doing is the timing of the occurrence of the
intention. In [21] it is experimentally established that the experience
of will typically is greatest when the intention is formed about 1 sec-
ond before the action is performed. As Wegner argues, the priority
principle does not necessarily need to be satisfied in order to have a
feeling of doing. People may sometimes claim their acts were willful
even if they could only have known what they were doing after the
fact [19]. Presumably, however, an agent that makes up an intention
after the fact to explain an event will (falsely) believe that it occured
prior to that event.
The contribution of the consistency principle to the experience of
will depends [...] on a cognitive process whereby the thoughts oc-
curring prior to the act are compared to the act as subsequently per-
ceived. When people do what they think they were going to do, there
exists consistency between thought and act, and the experience of
will is enhanced [19]. The comparison of thought and action is based
on a semantic relation that exists between the content of the thought
and the action as perceived. The thought may, for example, name the
act, or contain a reference to its execution or outcome. The mecha-
nism that determines the contribution of the consistency principle to a
feeling of doing thus relies on a measure of how strongly the thought
and action are semantically related. Presumably, the contribution of
the consistency principle is dependent on the priority principle. Only
thoughts consistent with the act that occurred prior to the perceived
act, within a short window of time, contribute to a feeling of doing.
The contribution of the exclusivity principle to the experience of
will consists in the weighting of various possible causes that are
available as explanations for an action. The principle predicts that
when the own thoughts of agents do not appear to be the exclusive
cause of their action, they experience less conscious will; and, when
other plausible causes are less salient, in turn, they experience more
conscious will [19]. People discount the causal influence of one po-
tential cause if there are others available [1]. Wegner distinguishes
between two types of competing causes: (i) internal ones such as:
3 Feeling of doing and experience of will are used interchangeably in this
paper. Wegner sometimes also uses the phrase experience of control as syn-
onym for the former phrases.
emotions, habits, reflexes, traits, and (ii) external ones such as ex-
ternal agents (people, groups), imagined agents (spirits, etc.), and
the agent’s environment. In the cognitive process which evaluates
self-agency these alternative causes may discount an intention as the
cause of action. Presumably, an agent has background knowledge
about possible alternative causes that can explain a particular event
in order for such discounting to happen. Wegner illustrates this prin-
ciple by habitual and compulsive behavior like eating a large bag
of potato chips. In case we know we do this because of compulsive
habits, any intentions to eat the chips are discounted as causes by
knowledge of such habits.
3 COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
One of our aims is to provide a computational model in order to val-
idate and explicate Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation.
This theory defines the starting point for the computational model.
But the theory does not describe the functioning of the affective-
cognitive mechanisms that lead to a feeling of doing at the level of
detail which is required for achieving this goal. We thus have to make
some modeling choices in order to specify how a feeling of doing is
created. In this section a computational model is introduced that pro-
vides a tool for simulating the feeling of doing. In the next section
the model is instantiated with an experiment performed by Wegner
as a means to validate that the model also fits some of the empirical
evidence that Wegner presents to support his theory.
It is clear that any model of the theory of apparent mental causa-
tion must be able to account for the varying degrees or levels in the
experience of a feeling of doing, the variation in timing of intention
and action, the match that exists between those, and the competi-
tion that may exist between various alternative causes. Neither one
of these factors nor the feeling of doing itself can be represented
as a two-valued, binary state, since humans can experience more or
less control over particular events. As observed in [19], even our con-
scious intentions are vague, inchoate, unstudied, or just plain absent.
We just don’t think consciously in advance about everything we do,
although we try to maintain appearances that this is the case.
Given the considerations above, it seems natural to use a proba-
bilistic approach to model the degrees of priority, and consistency
and to weigh the various competing alterative explanations. More-
over, the cognitive process itself that results in an experience of will
is an interpretive or inferential process. Given the various inputs re-
lating to time and perceived action, a cause that explains the action
is inferred which may or may not induce a feeling of doing. A natu-
ral choice to model such dependencies is to use Bayesian networks.
Bayesian networks [17] have been used extensively to model causal
inference based on probabilistic assessments of various sorts of evi-
dence (see for examples of this in research on a theory of mind e.g.
[8, 18]). Bayesian networks also allow us to use symbolic representa-
tions of the thoughts formed and the actions performed by an agent,
which need to be compared in order to compute a feeling of doing in
the theory of apparent mental causation.
However, Bayesian networks have their limitations. Essentially,
Bayesian networks define a joint probability distribution over a pre-
defined set of propositions. To stay within the topic of this paper,
one could easily construct a Bayesian network for a particular set of
intentions, actions and alternative causes for the actions. As an ex-
ample, Figure 1 shows a simple causal network modeling that the
closing of a door can be caused either by a strong wind or because
of the intention of an agent to close the door. The principles of pri-
ority and consistency can be encoded in the strengths of the depen-
dencies in the graph, i.e. in the conditional probability table associ-
ated with the node labeled as The door closes. Such models can be
constructed for every particular situation, but obviously this would
not provide a generic account. In the example, if we would like to
additionally consider the possibility that another person could have
closed the door, a new network would have to be introduced and a
new conditional probability table would have to be defined. Instead,
what is needed is a more general, higher-level theory that can be
used to reason over any event and its potential causes. The model
moreover should explicitly model the general principles of priority,
consistency and exclusiveness introduced above as well as the inter-
actions between them, rather than hide these contributing factors in
a single probability distribution.
Figure 1. A Simple Causal Network
As many have noted the shortcomings of Bayesian networks, there
has been a surge in research on generalizations of Bayesian networks
in recent years [13, 7, 9, 14]. These formalisms differ in notation and
in representational power, but central to all of these approaches is the
ability to represent probability distributions over relations or predi-
cates rather than over atomic propositions. In this paper, Multi-Entity
Bayesian Network (MEBN) Theory is used [14]. MEBN is a knowl-
edge representation formalism that combines the expressive power
of first-order logic with a sound and logically consistent treatment of
uncertainty.
An MEBN Theory consists of several MEBN fragments that to-
gether define a joint probability distribution over a set of first or-
der logic predicates. Figure 2 shows two MEBN fragments, each
depicted as a rounded rectangle, that model the priority principle.
A fragment contains a number of nodes that represent random vari-
ables. In accordance with the mathematical definition, random vari-
ables are seen as functions (predicates) of (ordinary) variables.
The gray nodes in the top section of a fragment are called context
nodes; they function as a filter that constrains the values that the vari-
ables in the fragment can take. In contrast to the nodes in the bottom
section of a fragment, context nodes do not have an associated prob-
ability distribution but are simply evaluated as true or false. Another
perspective on these nodes is that they define what the network is
about. The context nodes labeled with the IsA(t, v) predicate define
the type t of each of the variables v used. In our model, we distin-
guish intentions, events, opportunities, and time intervals in which
the former may occur. Intentions are mental states which are to be
distinguished from events, which are temporally extended and may
change the state of the world. Opportunities are states which enable
the performance of an action. In the model, the probabilities associ-
ated with each of the nodes should be interpreted as the likelihood
that the agent attaches to the occurrence of a particular state, event or
other property (e.g. causal relationship) given the available evidence.
Dark nodes in the bottom section of a fragment are called input
nodes and are references to nodes that are defined in one of the
other fragments. In Figure 2, the node in the right fragment labeled
Exists(a, ta) is an input node. To ensure that the model defines
a proper probability distribution, a node can be defined in a single
fragment only, in which it is said to be resident. The node labeled
Exists(a, ta) is resident in the left fragment in Figure 2.
As usual, the links between nodes represent dependencies. Every
resident node has a conditional probability table attached that gives
a probability for every state of the node given the states of its parent
nodes. Prior distributions are attached to resident nodes without par-
ents. Essentially, every fragment defines a parameterized Bayesian
network that can be instantiated for all combinations of its variables
that satisfy the constraints imposed by its context nodes.
In order to be able to compute a feeling of doing, the prior proba-
bility distributions are assumed to be given in this paper. The compu-
tational model presented does not explain how explanatory hypothe-
ses about perceived events are generated, nor does it include an ac-
count of the perception of these events. Even though the model as-
sumes this information somehow has already been made available, it
is setup in such a way that it already anticipates an account for com-
puting at least part of this information. In particular, the mechanism
approach of [1] to explain causal attribution has played a guiding role
in defining the model. The basic idea of this approach is that causal
attribution involves searching for underlying mechanism information
(i.e. the processes underlying the relationship between the cause and
the effect), given evidence made available through perception and in-
trospection. Assuming that each mechanism defines a particular co-
variation (or joint probability distribution) of the contributing factors
with the resulting outcome, the introduction of separate probability
distributions for each particular event that is to be explained can be
avoided. As a result, the number of priority and causality fragments
needed is a function linear in the number of mechanisms instead of
the number of events.
Figure 2. Priority Fragments
3.1 Priority Fragments
The priority principle is implemented by the Priority fragments in
Figure 2. Though these fragments are structurally similar, two frag-
ments are introduced in line with the idea that different causal mecha-
nisms may associate different time frames with a cause and its effect.
For reasons of space and simplicity, Figure 2 only depicts two frag-
ments, one associated with intentional mechanisms leading to action
and a second one for other causal events. The exact time differences
depend on the mechanism involved. For example, when moving the
steering wheel of a car one expects the car to respond immediately,
but a ship will react to steering with some delay.
The Exists random variables model that an agent may be uncertain
whether a particular state or event has actually taken place at a par-
ticular time (also called the existence condition in [12]). If there is
no uncertainty these nodes will have value true with probability one.
The probability associated with the Priority random variable is non-
zero if the potential cause occurs more or less in the right time frame
before the event that is explained by it and the associated probabil-
ity that the relevant events actually occurred is non-zero. In line with
[21], the probability associated with the intentional mechanism in-
creases as the time difference decreases to about one second. As one
typically needs some time to perform an action, the probability starts
to decrease again for time intervals less than one second. Each of the
fragments may be instantiated multiple times, illustrated in Section
4, depending on the number of generated explanatory hypotheses.
3.2 Causality Fragments
Figure 3 depicts two fragments corresponding respectively with the
intentional mechanism (left) and another type of mechanism (right)
that may explain an event. In this case, the fragments are structurally
different in two ways. First, even though both fragments require that
cause c and effect a are consistent with the mechanism associated
with the fragment, the consistency nodes are different. The type of
consistency associated with the intentional fragment, called inten-
tional consistency, is fundamentally different in nature from that
associated with other mechanisms as it is based on the degree of
semantic relatedness of the content of intention c and the event a
(represented as a probability associated with the node). This reflects
the fact that one of Wegner’s principles, the consistency principle, is
particular to intentional explanations. Second, an additional context
node representing an opportunity o to act on the intention is included
in the fragment corresponding with the intentional mechanism. An
intention by itself does not result in action if no opportunity to act
is perceived. In line with common sense and philosophical theory
[5], the intentional mechanism leads to action given an intention and
the right opportunity as input. The model entails that the presence of
multiple opportunities increases the probability that a relevant inten-
tion is the cause of an event. Additional detail is required to model
this relation precisely, but for reasons of space we refer to [10] for a
formal model.
Figure 3. Causality Fragments
The node labeled Cause(c, tc, a, ta) in the intentional fragment
models the feeling of doing. The associated probability of this node
represents the probability that the intention c of an agent has caused
event a. In other words, it represents the level of self-attribution of
agency for that agent. The probability associated with the node de-
pends on the priority and consistency as well as on the presence (i.e.
existence) of both c and a. Obviously, if either c or a is not present,
Cause(c, tc, a, ta) will be false with probability 1. Additionally, in
the intentional fragment an opportunity o must exist.
3.3 Exclusivity fragment
In order to model the exclusivity principle, an exclusivity fragment
is introduced as depicted in Figure 4. In general, if there are multiple
plausible causes for an event, exclusivity will be low. Technically,
this is modeled as an exclusive-or relation between the competing
causes. The value of the random variable Exclusivity is set to true
to enforce exclusivity. As a result, given two causes of which only
one is very likely, the posterior probability of the unlikely cause is
reduced. This effect is known as the discounting effect, also called
explaining away [17], and has been studied extensively (e.g. [1]).
Figure 4. Exclusivity Fragment
Given an event to be explained and a number of generated ex-
planatory hypotheses (including all contributing factors associated
with a particular mechanism), each of the fragments discussed is in-
stantiated accordingly, taking into account the context conditions.
To obtain a single, connected Bayesian network, all of the result-
ing fragments are connected by merging the reference nodes with
their resident counterparts. Using this network, the feeling of doing
can be computed by performing probabilistic inference and querying
the Cause(c, tc, a, ta) variable in the intentional fragment given the
values of the other nodes in the network. By querying other Cause
variables we can find by means of comparison which of the poten-
tial causes is the most plausible one. As a result, only when the node
representing the feeling of doing has a high associated probability an
agent would explain the occurrence of an event as caused by itself.
4 SIMULATION OF THE I SPY EXPERIMENT
In this section, an instantiation of the model that corresponds with an
experiment performed by Wegner is presented. In [21] the results of
the I Spy experiment are presented that tested whether participants
report an experience of agency for something that is most likely the
result of someone else’s action. In the experiment two participants
are seated on opposite sides of a table. On the table a square board
that is attached to a computer mouse is located and both participants
Figure 5. An instance of the model for the I Spy experiment
are asked to put their fingertips on the board and to move the mouse
by means of the board in slow sweeping circles. By doing so, a cursor
is moved over a computer screen showing a photo from the book I
Spy [15], hence the name of the experiment, picturing about 50 small
objects. The subjects had to move the mouse for about 30 seconds
after which they would hear a 10 second clip of music through head-
phones and within this period they had to stop moving the mouse
and then rate on a continuous scale whether they allowed the stop
to happen or intended the stop to happen. In addition to the music,
subjects would occasionally hear words over the headphones. Par-
ticipants were told that they would hear different bits of music and
different words. One of the participants however did not hear mu-
sic at all, but was a confederate who received instructions from the
experimenter to stop on a particular picture or to let the other par-
ticipant determine the stop. The forced stops were timed to occur at
specific intervals from when the participant heard a corresponding
word that was intended to prime a thought about items on the screen.
By varying timing, priority was manipulated. For unforced stops the
words heard by the participant corresponded about half of the time
to an object on the screen.
It turned out that in initial experiments in which the confederate
did not force stops the mean distance between stops and the pictures
that were primed by words was not significantly different from the
mean distance in trials in which the prime word did not refer to an ob-
ject on the screen. These initial experiments were performed to con-
firm that participants would not stop the cursor on an object simply
because of hearing the word. In consecutive experiments, however,
where the stops were forced by the confederator, participants tended
to perceive the stops as more or less intended, dependent on the time
interval between the hearing of the prime word and the actual stop.
In particular, if the word occurred between 5 and 1 seconds before
the stop, a significant increase in self-attribution was observed.
4.1 Instantiating the Model
Based on the description of the I Spy experiment and the results pre-
sented in [21], an instantiation of the computational model has been
derived.
Given the description of the experiment, a stop on or near a partic-
ular picture is only explainable by the movements made by the par-
ticipant and the confederate. The stop does not need to be interpreted
as an intentional action, however. This will depend on the likelihood
assigned by the participant that a relevant intention is thought to be
present by either the participant itself or the confederate. In the I Spy
experiment it is reasonable to assume that the explanatory hypothe-
ses generated by the participant consist only of intentions to stop the
cursor on a particular picture. Given the additional fact that the con-
federate forces a stop on a picture that corresponds with the prime
word, it is, moreover, reasonable to assume that to explain this event
only an intention to stop on the picture described by the prime word
and an opportunity to do so are generated. If the prime word is, for
example, swan, the participant thus is assumed to only generate the
hypotheses that the participant intends to stop on the swan picture
and the confederate intends to stop on the swan picture. These in-
tentions are supposed to be generated in conjunction with the oppor-
tunity to do so by means of moving the mouse. Finally, appropriate
time intervals need to be associated with the intentions as well as the
events. In the I Spy experiment, what matters is the actual time dif-
ference between these, so any choice of interval with the right time
difference can be used.
Figure 5 shows the Bayesian network that is obtained by merging
several instantiations of the model fragments as explained above and
by instantiating the variables with these values. Intentions are respec-
tively labeled Ip and Is and the opportunity is labeled o. The event
of stopping on the swan picture is denoted by S. The priority and
causality fragments associated with the intentional mechanism are
instantiated twice, once for the relevant participant’s intention and
once for the confederate’s intention. As a result, two possible causes
are identified which is reflected by the two Cause random variables
in the network. Each of the resident nodes are merged with input
nodes to obtain a single connected network.
4.2 Estimating Probability Distributions
Given that the structure of the network adequately models the partic-
ipant’s causal inferences, the remaining challenge is to associate the
appropriate (conditional) probability distributions with the nodes in
the network.
In the experiment it is tested whether primed words influence the
attribution of agency, or a feeling of doing. In the model this is re-
flected by the fact that the participant believes at least with some
probability that s/he formed an intention to stop on the picture. It is
not quite clear how probable the participant will think s/he had the
relevant intention based on the description in [21]. It is well-known
that priming may have various measurable effects but as reported in
[21] the behavior of the participant is not significantly influenced. It
may be that the participant constructs an intention after the fact and
that this intention reconstruction is influenced by the priming. In any
case, it seems that the probability should not be set too high. To incor-
porate a possible effect of priming it should be slightly higher than
uncertainty (a probability of 50%). Similar reasoning would indicate
that the participant’s belief that the confederate had the relevant in-
tention to stop on the swan picture would be less than 50%, simply
because there is no reason at all to suggest that the confederate would
have such an intention. Maybe the fact that during the instructions
the participant is informed that the confederate hears other words
may also be of influence on the relative certainty associated with the
belief that the confederate does not have the relevant intention.
The prior probability associated with the opportunity to stop on
a particular picture, we estimate, will be quite low. The description
in [21] does not make this completely clear. The setup suggests that
mouse movement will be less precise in comparison with the steering
of a mouse in more normal conditions. In line with this, the proba-
bility associated with the opportunity node is set to about 30%, to
reflect that it will be quite hard to steer the mouse to a target.
We assume that the participant has virtually no uncertainty about
the event to be explained, i.e. the stop on the swan picture, which
seems reasonable given the setup of the experiment which makes it
easy to observe where the cursor is located on the screen.
Finally, the prior probability of the intentional consistency nodes
has to be established. Since the prime word that the participant hears
refers to the object on which the cursor stopped on the screen (al-
though the precision is not indicated in [21]), we have set this prob-
ability quite high for both participant and confederate to about 80%
(both participant and confederate’s intention have the same content,
which semantically represents the stop event).
The remaining nodes for which we need to define conditional
probability distributions are the nodes labeled with Priority,
Cause and Exclusivity random variables. These conditional prob-
ability distributions are not given through perception or other infor-
mation about a particular event that is to be explained. These prob-
ability distributions are not situation-dependent in contrast with the
prior probabilities discussed above. They define the logic of the cor-
responding fragments.
The quantitative data presented in [21] about the influence of the
time interval between the primed word and the (forced) stop on the
reported perceived intention can be used to assign a probability dis-
tribution to the priority node. As mentioned above, the priority frag-
ment associates the probability that cause and effect are related to
each other in the right time frame depending on the mechanism. This
should be highest according to the findings presented in [21] for time
differences of 5 or 1 second, and very low for time intervals of 30
second and -1 second (i.e. the prime word is provided after the stop).
The conditional probability distribution associated with the
Cause random variable is defined as follows: It yields a high prob-
ability when all of its inputs are true; in case one of the Exists
nodes is believed to be very likely to be false, the Cause node has a
very low associated probability; the probabilities associated with the
Priority and IntentionalConsistency input nodes give rise to a
more gradual effect on the probability associated with the Cause
node.
Finally, the Exclusivity variable is defined as an exclusive-or
with some noise to indicate that exclusivity is the preferred state,
but such that the possibility of two causes that explain an event is not
completely excluded.
4.3 Evaluating the Results
The resulting model including the associated probability distribu-
tions gives the same results as those reported in [21]: If the a priori
probability associated with the Priority variables is higher (corre-
sponding to the time interval between 5 to 1 seconds), then a sig-
nificantly higher feeling of doing is produced than otherwise. The
second column of Table 1 shows the posterior probability of the
Cause(Ip, tp, S, ts) node that models the feeling of doing for sev-
eral a priori probabilities of the Priority variable. For a probability
of 0.85 for priority the probability of Cause corresponds to the feel-
ing of doing for a time difference of about 1 second as described in
[21]. Similarily, the values obtained with a probability for priority
of 0.8 and 0.35 correspond to the feeling of doing reported in [21]
for respectively 5 seconds and 30 seconds time diffence between the
prime word and the stop of the cursor.
In [21], also the variance in feeling of doing observed in the ex-
periment is reported. One would expect that a person’s personality
influences his feeling of doing. Various people, for example, might
be more or less sensitive to priming or might have a strong or weak
tendency to claim agency in a setup such as in the I Spy experiment.
We tested the model with different values of priority with a moder-
ated a priori probability for the existence of intention of 0.45 and
with a high a priori probability of 0.65 for the existence of an in-
tention. The corresponding posterior probabilities of the cause node
are shown in Table 1. These probabilities adequately correspond with
the variance reported by Wegner, which gives some additional sup-
port for the proposed computational model.
P (Exists(Ip, tp))
P (Priority) 0.55 0.45 0.65
0.3 0.41 0.36 0.45
0.35 0.44 0.39 0.48
0.5 0.51 0.46 0.56
0.8 0.62 0.56 0.66
0.85 0.63 0.58 0.67
Table 1. Posterior probability of Cause(Ip, tp, S, ts) for different a
priori probabilities of Priority(Ip, tp, S, ts) and Exists(Ip, tp).
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a first step towards a computational model of the self-
attribution of agency is presented, based on Wegner’s theory of ap-
parent mental causation [19]. A model to compute a feeling of doing
based on first-order Bayesian network theory is introduced that incor-
porates the main contributing factors (according to Wegner’s theory)
to the formation of such a feeling. The main contribution of this pa-
per is the presentation of a formal and precise model that provides
detailed predictions with respect to the self-attribution of agency and
that can be used to further test such predictions against other quan-
titative experimental data. An additional benefit of the model is that
given empirical, quantatitive data the parameters of the network can
be learned, using an algorithm as described in [14].
A number of choices had to be made in order to obtain a com-
putational model of Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation.
Not all of these choices are explicitly supported by Wegner’s theory.
In particular, it has been hard to obtain quantitative values to define
the probability distributions in our model. The report of the I Spy
experiment in [21] does detailed information, but did not provide
sufficient information to construct the probability distributions we
need. Certain values had to be guessed in order to obtain outcomes
corresponding with the results in [21]. The only validation of these
guesses we could perform was to verify whether variation of some of
the input values of our model could be said to reasonably correspond
with the reported variations in the experiment in [21]. It is clear that
more work needs to be done to validate the model. In future work,
we want to design and conduct actual experiments to validate and/or
refine the model of self-attribution.
To conclude, we want to remark that there are interesting relations
here with other work. As is argued in [18], Bayesian networks are
not sufficient as cognitive models of how humans infer causes. These
networks are very efficient for computing causes, but are themselves
instantiations from more general, higher-level theories. In a sense,
this is also the case in our model since both the consistency frag-
ment as well as the causality fragment in our first-order Bayesian
theory of apparent mental causation need to be instantiated by other
domain-specific theories in order to derive the right semantic rela-
tions between thoughts and actions, and to identify potential other
causes of events. Additional work has to be done to fill in these gaps
in the model, starting from e.g. ideas presented in [1, 18].
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